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 Introduction 
 On 6 April 1984, members of the Cameroonian Republican 
Guard, unhappy about personnel reductions facing their 
paramilitary organization, took up arms against the regime 
of President Paul Biya in a bloody, unsuccessful coup. 
Once the rebellion was thwarted, the Republican Guard 
was disbanded and organizers of the unrest were tried in 
front of a military tribunal. Not only were defecting officers 
removed from their posts, but most were executed or sen-
tenced to long prison terms. Following this failed coup, 
President Biya has managed to stay in office for decades 
and has not faced anti-government conflict of this nature 
since purging those responsible for the violence in 1984. 
 Shortly after signing a peace settlement terminating his 
country’s long-lasting civil war in 2002, Angolan president 
Jose Eduardo dos Santos dismissed several top-ranking 
members of the military, including the army chief of staff. 
The ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) party, led by dos Santos, persists in its position of 
considerable power, while the former rebel group UNITA 
(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) 
coexists peacefully as an opposition party. While the death 
of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi dealt a significant blow to 
the movement at the end of the conflict, the fact that UNITA 
did not resume fighting as it did in the mid-1990s is 
intriguing. In this paper, we seek to explore one possible 
explanation for the continued peace in Angola between 
MPLA and UNITA, as well as the lack of subsequent vio-
lence in Cameroon: by purging powerful military officials 
after these conflicts ended, these presidents demonstrated 
the strength of their authority not just to citizens generally, 
but also and specifically to remaining rebels who might 
have contemplated a renewed challenge if the government 
appeared vulnerable in the post-conflict period. 
 Extant literature on coup-proofing  1  suggests that such 
activities reduce military effectiveness, yielding decreased 
capabilities and negative outcomes in interstate conflict 
( Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011 ). Importantly, military ineffec-
tiveness could provide an environment ripe for civil con-
flict, as rebels are expected to seize upon moments when 
they are in a position of strength relative to the government. 
However, this poses an interesting puzzle: if coup-proofing 
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activities are dangerous, why do leaders use such strategies? 
We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing, military 
purges (especially the removal of high-ranking officials), 
could potentially deter subsequent domestic unrest by dem-
onstrating the capacity of the regime to remove powerful 
yet undesirable individuals from office. The strategic and 
intentional nature of purges signals to opponents that the 
regime is capable of not only identifying its enemies but 
also eliminating the threat posed by these enemies. Purges 
should be particularly effective at preventing conflict recur-
rence (as compared with onset generally), because during a 
previous conflict the dictator observed loyalty throughout 
his military and became more aware of domestic threats. 
Thus, he can make more informed decisions about which 
individuals to remove so as to avoid weakening the military 
in a vulnerable period of recovery.
Why do we observe coup-proofing?
Much of the conventional wisdom regarding coup-proofing 
suggests leaders will engage in these behaviors when they 
anticipate that coup risk is high (e.g. Belkin and Schofer, 
2003, 2005; Quinlivan, 1999; Stepan, 1971; Thyne, 2010). 
Conditions corresponding to poor living conditions, as well 
as threats to military stability and independence, are under-
stood to motivate the military to take matters into its own 
hands by way of a coup. In particular, substandard economic 
performance not only limits resources available to the armed 
forces, therefore increasing grievances and the desire for a 
change of leadership, but also promotes coup conditions by 
compelling the (impoverished) public to provide the crucial 
support needed for a coup to be carried out (Galetovic and 
Sanhueza, 2000; Thyne and Powell, 2016; Welch, 1970).
However, perceptions of low-coup-risk environment 
should not lull leaders into a false sense of security. In fact, 
contrary to the aforementioned literature, this sort of environ-
ment provides the optimal opportunity for a leader to coup-
proof. Sudduth (2015a) argues that engaging in coup-proofing 
behaviors when coup risk is already high can be counterpro-
ductive and serve to hasten a coup. The military will antici-
pate that, in a high coup risk environment, the leader will 
attempt to coup-proof, and thus the military is inclined to 
stage a counter-coup before the regime initiates coup-
proofing activities. Building on this logic, Sudduth demon-
strates that leaders are actually more inclined to engage in 
coup-proofing as the likelihood of overthrow by the military 
decreases, and the risk of coup is therefore comparatively 
low. Thus, coup-proofing strategies undertaken during times 
of strength help the leader avoid being overthrown.
How coup-proofing affects the risk of 
recurrence
At least with respect to interstate conflict, coup-proofing is 
generally found to yield negative results for the regime–this 
is often attributed to the notion that coup-proofing decreases 
military effectiveness (Makara, 2013; Pilster and Böhmelt, 
2011, 2012). However, the application of coup-proofing 
strategies to understanding civil conflict incidence has been 
understudied thus far. Powell (2014) employs the measure 
of effective organizations from Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) 
to demonstrate that maintaining more ground-based 
branches of the military decreases coup risk, but increases 
the likelihood of civil war onset in sub-Saharan African 
states. Considering a different coup-proofing strategy, 
Roessler (2011) finds that ethnic exclusion has a similar 
effect on the risk of unrest amongst the same set of coun-
tries. We add to this examination of the relationship between 
coup-proofing and civil conflict by considering how purges 
relate to domestic unrest; namely the recurrence of civil 
conflict globally (not just in sub-Saharan Africa).
One might wonder why we focus on civil conflict recur-
rence rather than onset. Crucially, in the post-conflict envi-
ronment we can more reasonably assume that combatants 
have an improved awareness of each others’ capabilities 
and resolve, at least in comparison with their awareness 
prior to the initial onset of violence. Combatants learn 
about the strength of their opponent(s) during conflict, so 
perceptions of the enemy should be more informed after 
war than before it. When former (and latent) rebels observe 
the leader engaging in targeted removal of military person-
nel after a conflict ends, rebels can assume that the regime 
perceives itself as being strong enough to withstand a 
potential challenge from within its ranks, and, presumably, 
it has tools to repel confrontation from rebels as well.
There remains the question of whether coup-proofing 
impairs military effectiveness. Importantly, there could be 
competing expectations for how leaders anticipate mili-
tary effectiveness to be impacted by purges. It is possible 
that purges disrupt cohesion amongst military personnel, 
encouraging betrayals and paranoia as officers scramble 
to demonstrate their loyalty (and disloyalty of enemies) to 
the regime. However, it is also possible that purges are an 
efficacious way to remove troublemaking individuals who 
foster the very discord that promotes military ineffective-
ness in the first place; the example from Cameroon is a 
case in point.
If the former is true, and purges impair military effec-
tiveness, we should expect rebels to seize upon the oppor-
tunity to (re-)initiate conflict against the government. 
However, particularly in the post-conflict environment, a 
leader should be remiss to remove officers if he anticipates 
this will weaken the military, thereby making the regime an 
attractive target for further challenges from rebels. Instead, 
a leader should engage in coup-proofing to strengthen his 
government in the face of threats, both from inside and out-
side the regime. We assume purges in a post-conflict envi-
ronment improve regime security while minimizing risk of 
military ineffectiveness and subsequent challenge from 
armed opponents.
We believe this is a reasonable assumption in the post-
conflict context because the leader has recently been 
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afforded the opportunity to observe his officers in action 
during combat. Thus, dictators are able to punish (via purg-
ing) those members of the armed forces who proved inef-
fective, or even disloyal, in combat. Leaders logically will 
not engage in purges that weaken the military as this makes 
them vulnerable to recurrent attack. Instead, they should 
purge officials when this strengthens the armed forces and 
their loyalty to the leader, and when it signals governmental 
strength to opposition groups. As a result, former and latent 
rebels view purges as a sign that the regime is strong and 
thus opponents will be deterred from renewing their fight. 
This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1a: Purges decrease the likelihood of civil 
conflict recurrence.
Furthermore, when high-ranking officers are removed 
from their posts, they often meet unfortunate fates such as 
imprisonment or death. Roessler (2011) warns that when 
the coup-proofing strategy of ethnic exclusion is employed, 
civil conflict can ensue as a result of the excluded individu-
als being motivated to join or form a rebellion as a result of 
their perceived injustice. In contrast, high-ranking purges 
leave the targeted enemies of the regime in positions where 
they cannot easily collaborate with opponents to challenge 
the government. Thus, we expect that when generals, com-
manders, or ministers are the targets of a purge, recurrence 
should be particularly rare. In other words, we have the 
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1b: When high-ranking officers are targeted, 
purges decrease the likelihood of civil conflict 
recurrence.
Research design
Our unit of analysis is the country-year, restricted to dicta-
torships that have previously experienced a civil conflict as 
defined subsequently.2 The dependent variable is coded 1 if 
a post-conflict country experiences the outbreak of a new 
or renewed civil conflict in a given year, and 0 if not. The 
population of intrastate conflicts for this study comes from 
the UCDP Armed Conflict Database (Themnà and 
Wallensteen, 2014). To be included, conflicts must involve 
the government as a combatant as well as at least one organ-
ized armed group, and there must be at least 25 battle deaths 
in a given year. Conflicts end in a year featuring fewer than 
25 battle deaths.
Our independent variables come from an original data-
set on purges (Sudduth, 2015b). These data cover all autoc-
racies3 from 1969–2003. Data on purges were gathered 
from a variety of news sources, including Keesing’s Record 
of World Events, LexisNexis news searches, and country 
studies. Sudduth (2015b) codes purges when one or more 
military officers are dismissed, demoted, or arrested for at 
least one of the following reasons: the officer was popular 
among other elites and is suspected to threaten the leader’s 
political survival, the officer had different policy prefer-
ences and criticized the dictator’s positions, and/or the 
officer was (presumed to be) responsible for plans to over-
throw the regime.4
We report results using two alternative specifications of 
purges. First, we use any purge, indicating whether any sort 
of purge occurred in a given year, from regular soldiers up 
to the highest military ranks, coded 1 if yes and 0 if no. 
There are 416 instances of these events in our dataset.
Second, we employ top purge, examining the purging of 
high-ranking officials. This includes positions such as army 
chiefs of staff, commanders of a branch of the military, and 
defense or interior ministers. We observe 191 cases of top-level 
purges in our data. We lag both variables by 1 year in order to 
ensure that the purge event predates conflict recurrence.
We include a number of control variables commonly 
associated with civil conflict. The outcome of the previous 
conflict has implications for the post-war environment 
(Quinn et al., 2007). In particular, decisive military victo-
ries should be less likely to produce renewed unrest. The 
variable victory comes from the UCDP Conflict 
Termination dataset (Kreutz, 2010) and is coded 1 if the 
conflict ended in military victory for the rebels or govern-
ment and 0 otherwise. We also control for the natural log 
of the duration of the previous conflict as well as the log of 
total battle-related deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). 
Finally, peacekeepers have been found to make recurrence 
less likely (Fortna, 2004; Kreutz, 2010). The variable 
peacekeepers is drawn from Heldt and Wallensteen (2005) 
and is coded 1 if a peacekeeping operation was present in 
the country and 0 if not.
Further determinants of conflict recurrence are country-
level conditions. We use data from Cheibub et al. (2010) to 
control for whether the dictatorship is a military regime 
(coded 1 if yes, 0 if civilian-led or a monarchy). We also 
draw the variable leader tenure from this dataset to account 
for how long the head of state has been in office. We control 
for population, the natural log of the country’s population, 
and GDP per cap, the natural log of per capita gross domes-
tic product from the previous year. Both variables are drawn 
from Gleditsch (2002). Data on infant mortality, IMR, 
comes from Abouharb and Kimball (2007), and this varia-
ble is also lagged 1 year to ensure that we capture condi-
tions influencing recurrence and not the other way around.
To account for various dynamics unique to the post 
Cold War period, we employ a variable indicating whether 
an observation occurs during that period (coded 0) or after 
1989 (coded 1). Finally, we control for the number of 
years since conflict termination by including peace years, 
as well as its squared and cubed polynomials in accord-
ance with Carter and Signorino (2010), to account for pos-
sible temporal dependence amongst observations. 
Summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 
A1 of the online appendix.
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Findings
Results are reported in Table 1. Because the dependent var-
iable is binary, we employ logistic regression to determine 
the effects of our covariates on the likelihood of civil con-
flict recurrence.5 Model 1 assesses the effect of purges at 
any level of the military on the likelihood of conflict recur-
rence, while Model 2 restricts consideration of purge events 
to those that involve the removal of high-ranking officers.
Model 1 suggests that purges in general do not have a statis-
tically significant effect on the likelihood that civil conflict will 
be renewed. While in some instances it might be true that mili-
tary purges prevent recurrence, it would appear that there are 
also some situations in which this has the opposite, or perhaps 
non-existent, effect. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is not supported.
Turning to the results for Model 2, whose coefficients 
are plotted in Figure 1, the effect of removing top military 
officials appears to reliably decrease the chances of recur-
rent conflict. The coefficient for top purge is negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that such coup-proofing 
efforts are an effective strategy for dictators seeking to 
avoid renewed unrest. Holding other covariates at their 
mean or median values, a move from no post-conflict 
purges to a purge of top officials is associated with a 75 per 
cent decrease in the relative risk of conflict recurrence.6 
This provides support for Hypothesis 1b, which holds that 
only purges of high-ranking figures systematically deter the 
recurrence of conflict.7
With respect to our control variables, we find that autoc-
racies with conflicts that ended in military victory tend to 
be more peaceful following termination than post-conflict 
dictatorships where the violence produced a stalemate or 
settlement. Interestingly, newly installed leaders appear to 
be less likely to face renewed unrest as compared with their 
more experienced counterparts. Recurrence is more likely 
in the post-Cold War period, and peacekeepers are some-
what effective in deterring a return to conflict.
We believe the contrast between our findings regarding 
recurrence and recent work on civil conflict onset can best 
be explained by the level of information dictators are able 
to employ when coup-proofing in the pre- versus post-con-
flict contexts. Work by Roessler (2011) and Powell (2014) 
regarding onset suggests that coup-proofing increases the 
risk of unrest because such activities destabilize and weaken 
the military. Conversely, we contend that leaders engage in 
post-conflict coup-proofing, purges in particular, in order to 
strengthen the war-fighting capacity and loyalty of the 
armed forces, making the government a more intimidating 
target for renewed attack. As Powell (2012: p. 1036) sug-
gests, “coup-proofing can bring increased stability to 
an otherwise vulnerable country”. We demonstrate that 
Table 1. Military purges and civil conflict recurrence.
Model 1 Model 2
Any purge −0.329  
 (0.327)  
Top purge −1.799 *
 (0.741)
Victory 0.100 0.140
 (0.298) (0.295)
Duration 0.361 ** 0.362 **
 (0.117) (0.117)
Battle deaths −0.096 −0.086
 (0.066) (0.065)
Peacekeepers −0.752 −0.845 *
 (0.430) (0.419)
Military regime −0.023 −0.081
 (0.309) (0.306)
Leader tenure −0.051 * −0.052 *
 (0.020) (0.020)
Population −0.018 −0.021
 (0.106) (0.108)
GDP per cap −0.318 −0.350
 (0.187) (0.194)
IMR 0.001 0.000
 (0.004) (0.004)
Post Cold War 0.812 ** 0.869 **
 (0.298) (0.308)
Peace years −0.192 ** −0.193 **
 (0.070) (0.064)
Peace years2 0.007 0.007 *
 (0.004) (0.003)
Peace years3 −0.000 −0.000
 (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.612 0.862
 (1.703) (1.766)
N 1024 1024
Post-conflict country-years in autocracies, 1969–2003.
Logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01.
GDP, gross domestic product; IMR, infant mortality rate.
Figure 1. Coefficient plot for Model 2 in Table 1.
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purging high-ranking officials, a coup-proofing strategy 
not considered previously, also promotes domestic peace, 
at least in the form of preventing recurrent rebellion.
Conclusion
Despite extant studies suggesting that coup-proofing meas-
ures impede military effectiveness and promote conflict, we 
demonstrate that not all forms of coup-proofing induce 
unrest. We differ from existing work by highlighting a previ-
ously unexplored aspect of coup-proofing: purges. Using 
new data, we find that purges of high-ranking military offic-
ers help prevent further unrest in dictatorships that have 
experienced civil conflict in the past. This suggests, perhaps 
perversely, that an effective method to deter remaining chal-
lengers from taking up arms is for a dictator to remove from 
office one or more generals, commanders, or defense-related 
ministers. In doing so, the leader signals to opponents that he 
is sufficiently strong so as to be able to withstand any fallout 
that might ensue following the purge of senior officials.
We suggest one possible explanation for the recurrence-
reducing effect of purges is that such actions warn oppo-
nents that the regime is able to identify and eliminate its 
enemies. However, our purge data are not sufficiently 
nuanced so as to differentiate between alternative mecha-
nisms that might account for this relationship. Future efforts 
to explore specifically how potential challengers view and 
react to military purges, likely using micro-level data, 
would certainly be welcome to further parse out the causal 
mechanism(s) at play here.
These data on autocratic purges could be employed in 
many innovative ways. For example, it would be useful to 
know how officer removal shapes democratization efforts, 
economic growth, the ability to attract and distribute external 
assistance, and so on. We offer initial insight into an implica-
tion of purges, showing that the removal of high-level offic-
ers fosters peace in post-conflict environments, but there is 
ample opportunity for further investigation of the causes and 
consequences of this coup-proofing strategy.
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Notes
1. Throughout this article we use the term “coup-proofing” to 
refer to strategies employed by a regime to inhibit the military’s 
ability to carry out a coup. Examples of such strategies include 
maintaining paramilitary organizations, dividing the military 
into several branches, and rotating officials between positions.
2. We present models from Table 1 using an alternative unit of anal-
ysis, conflict-years in autocracies, in online appendix Table A5.
3. Autocracies are defined in accordance with Cheibub et al. 
(2010).
4. Removal of officers for other reasons, such as punishment 
for human rights violations or peace agreement terms requir-
ing demobilization or ethnic integration of armed forces, 
are not coded as purges unless they also meet at least one of 
these criteria.
5. We also address duration dynamics with a Cox regression, 
reported in the online appendix Table A2. Results are robust 
to this alternative specification.
6. Clarify, the software developed by King et al. (2000) was 
used for this calculation.
7. We consider whether the recurrence-reducing effect of 
purges persists over time using alternative specifications of 
top purge. Results are robust across models presented in the 
online appendix Tables A3 and A4, and the comparable but 
smaller AIC for Model 2 in Table 1 leads us to present that 
specification here.
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